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This paper analyzes the  possibility of improving the efficiency  of  child benefit programs in an overlapping 
generations economy that has endogenous fertility and large government debt levels. We derive the conditions for 
this improvement using Representative-Consumer and Children-for-Representative-Consumers efficiency criteria in 
the endogenous fertility setting, as proposed by Michel and Wigniolle (2007). We find that the result crucially 
depends on the relative amount of accumulated government debt in the economy. When the elasticity of interest 
rates to child benefit is close to zero and there exists a huge amount of accumulated debt in the economy, financing 
child benefit programs by issuing debt and using lump-sum tax leads to RC-improvements. This finding is likely to 
hold in the economies of developed countries that have low fertility rates. We finally provide the implications of 
these findings on the real economy. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of the present paper is to analyze the relationship between child benefit and fiscal 
burden using an overlapping generations (OLG) model that has endogenous fertility. Lump-sum 
tax and public debt can be resources for the payment of child benefit. Although the tax burden of 
each generation focuses on its respective working period, this period also corresponds to the  
 
   




child-rearing period in some cases. Therefore, implementing child benefit programs financed by 
lump-sum tax in an exogenous fertility setting is a zero-sum game in that it transfers the fiscal 
burden to the same generation. Furthermore, financing child benefit programs by issuing public 
debt is also a zero-sum game in that it transfers the fiscal burden from the current generation to 
the future generation. However, if certain conditions are satisfied, this benefit has the potential to 
improve each generation's utility through the mitigation of the per-capita fiscal burden. 
In industrialized countries, the fiscal burden has been increasing. In Japan specifically, the 
debt:GDP ratio is the highest among industrialized countries, even beyond that of Italy. As is 
well known, the sustainability of the  Japanese fiscal and social security system is declining 
because of its low fertility rate and aging population. This situation has occurred because Japan 
now holds public debt explicitly and implicitly: explicit debt is approximately 180% of GDP 
with regard to government bonds, while implicit debt is approximately 230% with regard to the 
social security system, public pensions,  medical insurance, and elderly assistance. Therefore, 
Japan holds approximately 410% public debt compared with GDP. 
 
Table 1. Public Debt:GDP Ratio and the Total Fertility Rates (TFRs) of Industrialized Countries 
Country  Japan  Italy  France  Germany  UK  US 
Public debt  1.72  1.17  0.71  0.69  0.46  0.61 
TFR  1.33  1.32  1.87  1.28  1.66  2.04 
 
Source: United Nations (2006), Homepage of the Ministry of Finance, Japan
1 
 
Moreover, the Baby  Boomer generation, which  comprises  the  largest  share of the total 
                                                   
1  http://www.mof.go.jp/tax_policy/summary/condition/007.htm  
 
   




population, is beginning to cross over to the benefit side of the social security system. Thus, 
attempts to reduce benefits will face political limitations, thereby implying that Japan’s massive 
public debt must be paid for by the current working generation and future generations. 
In addition, the fertility rate in Japan has been decreasing since the 1950s. In order to 
maintain the current  population level  of  128  million
2, it is considered necessary for  each 
Japanese woman to bear 2.08 children. This TFR in Japan was above 2.08 before the 1970s, but 
since then, it has fallen below that number
3. The relationships between (explicit) debt:GDP ratio 
and fertility rate in developed countries are shown in Table 1.   
These demographic factors raise the following question: what is the most economically 
efficient way for this burden to be shared by each generation? The answer will essentially differ 
depending on whether the model is based on exogenous fertility or endogenous fertility.   
For this reason, recent studies clarify that the Pareto-efficiency condition of the exogenous 
fertility model differs from that of the endogenous one. First, in the case of an exogenous fertility 
model, we make use of the OLG model that was introduced by Diamond (1965). Three types of 
steady states exist in this model: under-accumulation, golden rule, and over-accumulation. The 
first two steady states are Pareto-efficient, but the third is not. In addition, the empirical study by 
Abel et al. (1989) reports that in industrialized countries dynamic efficiency is satisfied. In a 
steady state, dynamic efficiency corresponds to under-accumulation (or golden rule). Therefore, 
the possibility that industrialized countries are in a state of under-accumulation seems high. 
In an exogenous fertility setting, an allocation is said to be Pareto-efficient if it is impossible 
to make certain individuals better off without making other individuals worse off. For this reason, 
                                                   
2  Based on Census 2010 
3  Latest TFR in Japan is 1.39 in 2010 (Vital Statistics of Japan by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare)  
 
   




in an exogenous case, we cannot improve any generation’s utility while at the same time 
sacrificing another’s utility. 
However,  recent studies  clarify the properties of the competitive equilibrium in  an 
endogenous fertility setting.  Raut and Srinivasan (1994) and Chakrabarti (1999) analyze the 
properties of the inter-temporal equilibrium in such a setting.  Moreover,  Conde-Ruiz  and 
Gimenez (2002) and Golosov et al. (2004) define Pareto-efficiency criteria in an endogenous 
fertility framework. 
Building on  these studies,  Michel and Wigniolle (2007)
4  point out the possibility that 
under-accumulation may not be efficient in an endogenous fertility setting. This implies that 
certain policies may improve one generation’s welfare without making another worse off, even 
when it is in an under-accumulation state near the steady state. Moreover, Michel and Wigniolle 
(2007) confirm that the Representative-Consumer efficient (RC-efficient
5) condition, which is a 
concept developed in their study, is deeply connected with the sign-of-inequality relationship 
between child-rearing cost and wage rate. In other words, if certain  policies  influence  this 
relationship, they may be able to improve RC-efficiency. 
Michel and Wigniolle (2007) also  prove that  using  an OLG model that has endogenous 
population growth might improve RC-efficiency in the case of a state of under-accumulation. 
However, they do not analyze an economy model using public debt. Therefore, there is great 
research  interest in the possibility of improving RC-efficiency in an  economy  that has huge 
                                                   
4  Although several approaches have endogenized fertility decisions, Michel and Wigniolle (2007) depend on the 
benchmark framework, which assumes that children are consumption goods that appear in the utility function of 
their parents (Becker, 1960; Willis, 1973; Eckstein and Wolpin, 1985). Other approaches are based on the 
additional assumption of descendant altruism, as in Becker and Barro (1988) or the assumption of ascendant 
altruism and the strategic behavior of parents, as in Nishimura and Zhang (1992). 
5  This can be defined as an allocation for which no other allocation exists that would lead to a higher level of 
utility for all generations with a strict improvement for (at least) one generation.  
 
   




public debt, a low fertility rate, and endogenous population growth such as that of Japan. 
In this paper, we thus focus on child benefit programs that are financed by public debt, which 
influence the conditions necessary for RC-efficiency in the following way. First, there exists a 
path from reducing the per-capita fiscal burden to increasing the fertility rate, which can be 
found in simple models that do not include capital accumulation. Second, as shown by models 
that include capital accumulation, child benefit may affect an individual’s expenditure through 
current fertility level and interest rates, which cause the consumption amount in the subsequent 
period. The first condition has a particular effect when an economy holds huge levels of public 
debt such as that of Japan. 
Intuitively, there is the possibility to improve RC-efficiency
6  by financing a child benefit 
program with newly issued debt when the accumulated amount of public debt is huge based on 
the following logic. Suppose such a child benefit program raises the fertility rate to a certain 
level. The influence of this newly issued debt on accumulated debt levels depends on the size of 
the latter. If the effect of the rise in fertility is the same irrespective of the level of accumulated 
debt, then such a policy may lessen per-capita debt without harming any generation. In this 
scenario, even the initial generation is not made worse off because they do not endure the burden. 
However, the situation of the initial generation might worsen if the child benefit program were to 
be financed by lump-sum tax. We first show this situation using a simple model and then derive 
conditions in a general setting. Note that,  with  this  logic,  this  approach  achieves not only 
RC-improvement but also Children-for-Representative-Consumers (CRC)-improvement
7. 
This remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a simple 
                                                   
6  A change to a different allocation that makes (at least) one generation better off without making any other 
generation worse off. 
7  CRC-improvement means RC-improvement that does not decrease any generation’s fertility rate.  
 
   




model for grasping an intuitive understanding. In Section 3, we use this model for our main 
analysis. In Section 4, we derive the conditions for  RC-improvement using the model  and 
describe  the additional conditions for  CRC-improvement.  In  Section 5, we analyze the 
superiority of public debt and tax with regard to financing child benefit programs. Section 6 
concludes.   
 
2. Simple analysis 
In this section, we analyze a  simple model to show the characteristics  of child benefit 
programs that are financed by public debt in preparation for assessing the rigorous model in 
Section 3. As an example, we first intuitively analyze the relationship between child benefit and 
fiscal burden in the case of intergeneration selfishness in a simple economy that has only two 
generations, namely a parent (first) generation and a child (second) generation. Second, using an 
OLG model that features these  two generations, we show that child benefit can  improve 
RC-efficiency. 
For simplicity, we consider that individuals live two periods, namely young and old, and that 
they have children when they are young. We assume that the second generation does not have 
children and that government expenditure is set to zero in the baseline case. The debt level at the 
beginning is set to  D   and the government subsidizes  δ per child for child-rearing activity, 
which is financed by issuing bonds. In this simple model, we let  N   denote the population of the 
first generation,  nN   that of the second generation,    interest rates,  z   child-rearing costs,  j X
and  j Y   consumption when young and old,  W   lifetime income, and  j T ( 2 , 1 = j )  the fiscal 
burden in lump-sum tax. Using the variables above, we find the following budget constraints for  
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By solving the per-capita fiscal burden of the second generation from equations (1) to (3), we 
get the following relationship: 
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δ    (4) 
If  0 / 2 < ∂ ∂ δ T   is satisfied, enlarging child benefit programs financed by bonds decreases the 
fiscal burden of the second generation without decreasing any generation’s fertility rate. It is thus 













T N D d where n 　 　 　 and / , 1    (5) 
The left-hand  side represents the fiscal burden of the second generation, whereas  the 
denominator on the right-hand side represents the elasticity of fertility to child benefit programs. 
As long as the ratio of child-rearing subsidy to elasticity is less than the per-capita fiscal burden 
of the second generation, child benefit programs decrease the per-capita fiscal burden of the 
second generation. Specifically, the after-tax lifetime income of the second generation increases, 
which  implies that lifetime utility rises. The lifetime utility of the first generation also rises 
because of the child benefit programs financed by bonds. In addition, the fertility rate rises, too. 
Overall, in the case that equation (5) holds, a child-rearing policy that is financed by bonds may  
 
   




attain not only RC-improvement but also CRC-improvement. 
 
3. Model 
In this section, we construct a model to consider the condition of financing child benefit by 
bonds in order to affect RC-improvement and, possibly, CRC-improvement. Detailed settings are 
shown in the following subsections. 
 
3.1. Household 
Generation  t   live across two periods, namely period  t   when they are young and period 
1 + t   when they are old. Furthermore, they earn a lifetime income  , enjoy consumption  t X  
when young and  1 + t Y   when old, and raise children  t n   at cost  z , subsidized by  t δ . Generation 
t   have to take over per-capita debt  t d   from generation  1 − t   by paying lump-sum tax  t T   when 
young, and they give their per-capita debt  1 + t d   to the following generation  1 + t   when old. 
 
Assumption 1  U   is a function of 
3
+ R   to  } {−∞ ∪ R , and  U   maps 
3
+ + R   to  R, with 
. / ) , , ( every for  ) , , ( lim ) , , (
3 3
) , , ( ) , , ( + + + → ∈ = R R Y X n Y X n U Y X n U
Y X n Y X n 　  
U   is twice continuously differentiable on 
3
+ + R , strictly concave, increasing in each argument, 
homogeneous of degree one, and satisfies the Inada conditions: 
. lim lim lim
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In this case, the lifetime utility and budget constraints  of generation  t   are  described  as  
 
   





) , , ( 1 + = t t t t Y X n U U    (6) 
t t t t t t T W S X n z − = + + − ) ( δ    (7) 
t t t S R Y 1 1 + + =    (8) 
The first-order conditions for maximizing lifetime utility are as follows: 
t
n




= = +1     (9) 
From the above equations, we can derive the following relationships: 
) , , ( 1 t t t t t R T W X X δ + − =    (10) 
) , , ( 1 1 t t t t t R T W Y Y δ + + − =    (11) 
) , , ( 1 t t t t t R T W n n δ + − =    (12) 
) , , ( 1 t t t t t R T W S S δ + − =    (13) 
Functions  X ,  Y ,  n, and  s  are defined on 
3
+ + R   and are continuously differentiable.   
 
3.2. Firm 
We assume that, in period  t , there exists a representative firm that produces goods using 
capital  t K   and labor  t L   under perfect competition using the following function, which is 
homogeneous of degree one. We define  f   as  ) 1 , ( ) ( k F k f ≡ . 
 
) , ( t t t L K F Q =    (14) 
 
Assumption 2  + + → R R : f , and for all  0 > k ,  0 ) ( > ′ k f   and  0 ) ( < ′ ′ k f .  
 
   



































































f R    (16) 
 
3.3. Government 
Suppose that the population of generation t   is expressed as  1 1 − − = t t t N n N , and that the 
government subsidizes child-rearing under the following budget constraints. The reimbursement 
of  the  per-capita debt of generation  1 − t   and child-rearing subsidy  t δ   are financed by 
lump-sum tax  t T   and newly issued bonds  t d : 
t t t t t t t t t t N n N d R N d N T δ + = + − − 1 1  










1    (17) 
 
3.4. Market equilibrium 
Suppose that the labor market is balanced as  t t N L = , and that the capital and savings in the 
capital market are balanced. Then, with  t t t N K k / ≡ , we have the following:   
) ( and ) ( t t t t k R R k W W = = 　 　    (18) 
) ( 1 t t t t d S N K − = +    (19) 
Because  () t Rk is a strictly decreasing function of  t k because of  0 ) ( < ′ ′ k f , this function is  
 
   




bijective. Thus, we have the following strictly decreasing function: 
() tt k kR =    (18’) 
Equation (19) is verified as being equivalent to the following commodity market-clearing 
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Definition 1 Starting from initial conditions  1 − N ,  0 N ,  0 K , and  )) / ( ( 1 0 1 0 0 − − + = N K d R Y , given debt 
management policies and child-rearing subsidies  } ) , {( 0
∞
= t t t d δ , an inter-temporal equilibrium is a 
sequence  } ) , , , , {( 0
∞
= t t t t t t n Y X N K , which satisfies (7)–(9) and (17)–(19). 
 
4. The inter-temporal equilibrium 
In this section, based on the model presented in Section 3, we examine the condition for 
financing child benefit by issuing bonds in order to achieve RC-improvement. Then, an example 
using a simple function is considered.   
First, we derive the condition of child benefit programs that improves the lifetime utility 
levels of all generations without sacrificing the welfare of any single generation. Because it is 
difficult to derive such a condition rigorously in an analytical sense, for simplicity, we thus 
assume that  ) (⋅ = t U U   is homogeneous of degree one. In addition, we define the variables as 
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The government budget constraints can be rewritten as: 
t




































     (22) 
From equations (9) and (22), we can solve the variables of equation (21) as a function of 
) , ( 1 + − t t R z δ . Substituting these variables into (19), we obtain the following:   
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1 1 1 − − = + − + + + δ δ δ    (23) 
) ( 1 1 t t t k k δ + + = ⇔  
 




= t t d , an inter-temporal equilibrium is characterized by 
the sequence  } ) {( 0
∞
= t t δ   such that  0 ≥ ∀t ,   
t t t t t t t t t d k R z S k k R z n
~
)] ( , [
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1 1 1 − − = + − + + + δ δ δ    (24)  
 
   




   
The proof is straightforward. A sequence  0 ) ( ≥ t t k   is characterized by a sequence  0 ) ( ≥ t t δ   in this 
setting, while an inter-temporal equilibrium is characterized by a sequence  0 ) ( ≥ t t k   according to 
Michel and Wigniolle  (2007). Hence, an inter-temporal equilibrium is characterized by a 
sequence  0 ) ( ≥ t t δ . 
We define the function  Γ  as:     
( , ) [ , ( )]( ) [ , ( )] z k n z fk k s z fk d δ δ δδ ′′ Γ− ≡ − + − − +    
Γ  is defined on 
2
+ + R   and is continuously differentiable. Equation (24) can be rewritten as: 
0 )) ( , ( 1 = − Γ + t t t k z δ δ  
 
In this setting, the equation is no longer dynamic because the function is only of  1 + t k   but not 
of  t k .  Because  1 + t k is a function of  t δ , once we have a sequence of  0 ) ( ≥ t t δ , a unique 
inter-temporal equilibrium  0 ) ( ≥ t t δ   may exist, as described next. Before that, we need to make 
some assumptions on how savings and the fertility rate react to changes in interest rates and child 
benefit. 
In the following, we deal with several cases in terms of preferences. In the first case, we 
consider the case with preferences with which  0 / 1 > ∂ ∂ + t t k δ   is satisfied. Next, we consider the 
opposite case. Then, we show that, under certain assumptions,  0 / 1 > ∂ ∂ + t t k δ   will not occur. 
Before that, we make the following assumption. 
 
Assumption 3-1 Following a change in interest rates, we assume that savings and the fertility  
 
   
















    where 
1 11 1 1




t t tt t t
Rn Rk
tt t t t t
R n R k R kR
n R k R kR R
ηη
+ ++ + +









The first part of the above assumption means that savings as a proportion of after-tax income 
increase when interest rates increase. The second part of it means that the elasticity of the 
adjusted fertility rate with respect to interest rates is negative or, even if it is positive, it is 
inelastic compared with asset elasticity. Note that as  11 () 0 0 t t Rk kR R η ++ ∂ ∂ <⇔ >  holds from 
0 ) ( < ′ ′ k f , the second part of the above assumption is satisfied if  0 Rn η ≤    holds. Thus, the 
following assumption is sufficient under which assumption 3-1 holds. 
 
Assumption 3-2 The following assumption is the sufficient condition of assumption 3-1: 
0, 0 RR sn ≥≤   
 
Proposition 2 Under assumptions 1, 2, and 3-1,  0 0 > ∀k ; for any sequence 
∞
= ∀ 0 } { t t δ , there exists a 
unique inter-temporal equilibrium 
∞
= + 0 1} { t t k   starting from a given initial condition  0 0 > k . 
 
Proof See Appendix A. 
 
The difference from the findings of Michel and Wigniolle (2007) is that there are  no  
 
   




dynamics in k   in our model because  we have assumed homogeneity with household 
preferences, which drops the effect of wage rate determined by the capital level in the same 
period. 
Our next interest is in the relationship between  k   and  δ . In the following subsection, we 
consider two cases about this sign:  one is the case when  0 / > ∂ ∂ δ k   and the other is when 
0 / < ∂ ∂ δ k . For this, we need to make additional assumptions about  s  and  n  given a change in
δ . 
 
Definition 2  An inter-temporal equilibrium  0 ) , , , , ( ≥ t t t t t t n Y X N K   is said to be converging if the 
sequence  t t t N K k / =   converges to a limit  0 > k   when    approaches infinity. If  t k   converges 
to a limit  k , it is straightforward to show that  ) ( t t k R R = ,  ) ( t t k W W = ,  t X ,  t Y ,  and    are 
converging to constant values  R ,  W ,  X ,  Y , and  n .   
 
Definition 3 A converging inter-temporal equilibrium  0 ) , , , , ( ≥ t t t t t t n Y X N K   is said to converge in a 
state of under-accumulation if  n R > . It is said to converge in a state of over-accumulation if 
n R < . 
 
Definition 4 (RC-allocation)  A feasible allocation with representative consumers (or 
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t n Y X N K   for  2 , 1 = i   be two feasible RC-allocations. 
Allocation 1 is said to RC-dominate allocation 2 if it leads to a higher level of utility for all 
generations, with a strict improvement for (at least) one generation. Formally, this is: 
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t n Y X N K   for  2 , 1 = i   be two feasible 
RC-allocations. Allocation 1 is said to CRC-dominate allocation 2 if it leads to a higher level of 
utility for all generations, with a strict improvement for (at least) one generation, without 
decreasing any generation’s fertility rate. Formally, this is: 
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t n Y X N K   for  2 , 1 = i   be two feasible 
RC-allocations. If allocation 1 RC-dominates allocation 2, a shift from allocation 2 to allocation 
1 is termed an RC-improvement. 
 










t n Y X N K   for  2 , 1 = i   be two feasible 
RC-allocations. If allocation 1 CRC-dominates  allocation 2, a  shift from allocation 2 to  
 
   




allocation 1 is termed a CRC-improvement. 
 
If allocation 2 were changed to allocation 1 using child benefit programs, an 
RC-improvement or CRC-improvement would be achieved. 
 



























   
First, we consider the sign of  t t k δ ∂ ∂ + / 1 . Taking the derivative of equation (23) with respect to 
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Provided assumption 3-1 holds, we derive the following proposition:  
 
   





Proposition 3 RC-improvement is achieved by financing child benefit using public debt when 
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Proof See Appendix B.   
 
The first condition implies that the income from child benefit programs must exceed the loss 
of consumption in the second period because of a decrease in interest rates. If individuals 
originally plan to consume more in the second period, an interest rate decrease might make them 
worse off  because of negative income effects. However, if individuals have children, child 
benefit may bring positive income effects. In order to satisfy this condition, it is necessary for the 
second effect to dominate the first. If the elasticity is small enough, the condition is satisfied as 
long as there exists a certain level of child benefit program available. 
The second condition requires that the elasticity of fertility rate to child benefit be bigger 
than is the ratio of per-capita amount of child benefit to that of accumulated debt. In countries 
that have huge levels of accumulated debt but relatively small levels of child benefit, the second 
condition is likely to hold; however, this requires that child benefit programs be bigger for the  
 
   




first condition to be true.   
It is interesting that equations (5) and (27) are the same. This implies that condition (27) 
more likely holds as the amount of per-capita debt grows, which is true for the financial situation 
of the government sector in Japan, as examined in Section 2. However, in the model that has 
capital accumulation presented in this section, we need the additional condition (26). It would 
then  be possible to examine the possibility of RC-improvement by  granting  child-rearing 
subsidies financed by bonds if we could confirm that equations (26) and (27) actually hold in an 
empirical analysis. An interesting point is whether it is possible to implement RC-improvement 
in the real economy.   
We briefly discuss that possibility in the following subsection by focusing on the case of the 
Japanese economy, which, as previously mentioned, has a huge level of per-capita debt and a 













+ > > δ
δ η δ
η  
Although it is hard to estimate the actual elasticities of the Japanese economy,  R δ η   is not 
considered too high (it might even be close to zero). The Japanese economy is large enough that 
interest rates remain almost unaffected by such a policy. By contrast,  n δ η   is assumed to be 0.05, 
which implies that a 100% increase in child benefit would increase the fertility rate by 10%. In 
this case, when child benefit increases from 10,000 yen to 20,000 yen every month, the fertility 
rate might increase from 1.34 to 1.39. If the debt amount  t d   is 20 million yen, then as long as 
child benefit per child is below 1 million yen, this condition is satisfied. Furthermore, although 
the Japanese population is not decreasing dramatically at present, it is expected to decline much 
more rapidly in the future. In such a case, per-capita debt would increase dramatically, thereby  
 
   




leading to a greater possibility for RC-improvement. 
 
 
4.2. Case 2: if  0 ~ ≤ δ s   and  0 ~ > δ n   are satisfied   







































































   (25’) 
 
In this case, we need the conditions for improving efficiency as discussed above. 
 
Proposition 4 RC-improvement is achieved by financing child benefit using public debt when 
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This proposition is true even in the case of  1 /0 tt k δ + ∂ ∂≤. 
 
Proof See Appendix C.   
 
This condition implies that the elasticity of the fertility rate to child benefit should be high  
 
   




enough to dominate the right-hand side effects. We consider a small change of  t δ . First, when 
the elasticity of  k   to  δ   is  considered  to be not  too  high, it is likely that  the condition is 
satisfied. In that case, both  R δ ε   and  W δ η   are close to zero, which also renders the right-hand 
side of equation (28) close to zero and thus satisfies the condition. 
Second, as  1 − t d   increases, the condition becomes more likely to be satisfied, as shown in 
Proposition 3. This shows that the possibility of improving efficiency by financing child benefit 
is higher in both cases when the level of existing debt is huge. We provide sufficient conditions 
for  RC-improvement  in  the  case  of  1 /0 tt k δ + ∂ ∂>  and  1 /0 tt k δ + ∂ ∂<.  By using the 
Cobb–Douglas utility function and  the  production function  () t tt f k Ak
ρ = ,  the relationship 
between  k   and  δ   seems to hold:  1 /0 tt k δ + ∂ ∂<. This characteristic is expanded as follows: 
 
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3-2,  1 /0 tt k δ + ∂ ∂≤  holds. 
 
Proof See Appendix D.   
 
 
We  next provide  an example of  when  RC-improvement is achieved.  This  example  satisfies 
assumptions 1, 2, and 3-2, and thus, Proposition 4 is valid in this example. 
 
Example 1 We assume specific forms for preferences and production technology in the above 
model. Suppose we have preferences:    
 
   




β α β α − −
+ =
1
1 t t t Y X n U  
and production technology:   
. ) (
ρ
t t t k A k f =  
Thus, RC-improvement is achieved because the following relationships are satisfied: 
    
1)  if  ) 1 )( 1 (
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~
t d  
 
See Appendix E for detailed calculations. Note that from (C-2) in Appendix C, this condition is 
also sufficient for CRC-improvement. 
 
In this example, we quantify the RC-improvement in the real economy. Because the concern 
of the present paper is whether RC-improvement occurs by adjusting the amount of child benefit,  
 
   




providing the parameters of the above function from the real economy allows us to derive the 
exact condition for RC-improvement. 
In a typical national economy, the capital income ratio  ρ   is 0.3. Suppose that the preference 
α   over children is set as 0.0025 or 0.005 and the preference  β   over consumption during the 
young period is set as 0.6 or 0.7. Thus, we can calculate the parameter  Φ   of equation (29) in 
Table 2. This parameter  Φ   is the upper limit of the child benefit amount under the constraint 
that  t d
~   satisfies equation (30). In other words, as long as the economy satisfies the condition 
Φ < z / δ , we can effect RC-improvement in the economy by increasing child benefit. In such a 
case, only the amount of debt matters, whereas fertility rate does not. 
 
5. Debt financing vs. tax financing 
In this section, we compare the advantages of financing child benefit programs using either 
public debt or lump-sum tax. To this end, we change the budget constraints of the government 
sector in our model as follows: 

























     (31) 
where  θ   stands for the ratio of tax resources to child-rearing support: if  1 = θ , child benefit is 
financed by tax only, and if  0 = θ , it is financed by public debt only. Then, from equations (21) 
and (31), we can derive the indirect utility function as follows: 
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where  
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− −  
In this setting, we can derive the following proposition under the assumption of the preferences 
and production technology of Example 1. 
 




= − , when  *
~
d d t > ,
 
all tax 
financing ( 1 = θ ) is optimal. By contrast, when  *
~
d d t < , all debt financing ( 0 = θ ) is optimal if 
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Proof See Appendix F. 
 
We have proven in Proposition 6 that debt financing is optimal if and only if  *
~
d d t <   and  t δ  
are sufficiently small. However, this proposition can be extended to a general utility function and 
a general production function. 
 
Proposition 7 Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3-2, namely weaker versions of the Inada condition, 
no child benefit condition,  and stationary state condition, there exists 
* d   such that debt  
 
   




financing is optimal if and only if 
* dd <    holds, where: 
1. Weaker version of Inada condition means 
0 lim '( ) 0
k fk
→+ >   and  lim '( ) 0
k fk
→∞ = . 
2. Stationary state means  ,, ,,, tt t ttt d dn nX XY Yk kδδ ≡≡ ≡ ≡≡≡      . 
3. No child benefit condition means  0 δ ≡ . 
 
 
Proof See Appendix G. 
 
We next return to Proposition 6, again using a Cobb–Douglas utility function and a specified 
production function. According to Proposition 6, debt financing is optimal only in the case of 
*
~




















− − < ⇐
1
1 　　
   
  (33) 
In order to smooth consumption during young and old periods, we also assume the following: 
 
Assumption 4 The preference parameters of Example 1 satisfy the following relationship: 
β α β − − >1  
⇔   β α 2 1− >
   
(34) 
 
Then, from the constraint of  0 > α , in equations (33) and (34), we can derive the following  
 
   




corollary, as the necessary condition with regards to debt financing. 
 
Corollary 1 Under Proposition 4 and Assumption 4, the necessary condition that debt financing 
is optimal is 3 / 1 < ρ . 
 
Proof First,  ) 1 /( 1 ρ ρ β − − < is derived from (33) and  0 > α . Next,  ) 1 /( ρ ρ β − > is derived from 




Moreover, we can derive the following proposition and example in the case of tax financing, as 
shown in previous sections: 
 
Proposition  8  RC-improvement is achieved by financing  child benefit using  lump-sum tax 
resources when the following is true: 
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Proof See Appendix H. 
  
 
   





Example 2 We assume the preferences and production technology that were described Example 
1. Thus, the sufficient condition for RC-improvement in Proposition 8 is: 
 
  if  　 　 β α
ρ ρ
β
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See Appendix I for detailed calculations. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we derive the conditions for RC-efficiency in an endogenous population growth 
setting. Accordingly, when the elasticity of interest rates to child benefit is close to zero and 
there exists a huge amount of accumulated debt  in the economy,  financing  child benefit 
programs by issuing debt and using lump-sum tax leads to RC-improvements. 
The weakness of this study is that we make assumptions based on certain preferences, such 
as homogeneity. The findings would be more worthwhile if it were possible to show these results 
more generally. We will carry out this assignment in subsequent research.  
 
   




Table 2. Range of Child Benefit with RC-improvement 
 
1)  Case 1: 3 . 0 = ρ ,  0025 . 0 = α
 
and  　 6 . 0 = β   or  　 7 . 0 . 
Preference Parameters of Utility  Debt Parameters 
Upper Limit   










  1 d   1 d   Φ  
0.0025    0.700    0.298    0.220    0.211    0.298    0.265   
0.0025    0.700    0.298    0.230    0.211    0.298    0.578   
0.0025    0.700    0.298    0.240    0.211    0.298    0.662   
0.0025    0.700    0.298    0.250    0.211    0.298    0.685   
0.0025    0.700    0.298    0.260    0.211    0.298    0.673   
0.0025    0.700    0.298    0.270    0.211    0.298    0.624   
0.0025    0.700    0.298    0.280    0.211    0.298    0.499   
0.0025    0.700    0.298    0.290    0.211    0.298    0.093   
                           
0.0025    0.600    0.398    0.290    0.281    0.398    0.294   
0.0025    0.600    0.398    0.300    0.281    0.398    0.614   
0.0025    0.600    0.398    0.310    0.281    0.398    0.708   
0.0025    0.600    0.398    0.320    0.281    0.398    0.747   
0.0025    0.600    0.398    0.330    0.281    0.398    0.763   
0.0025    0.600    0.398    0.340    0.281    0.398    0.763   
0.0025    0.600    0.398    0.350    0.281    0.398    0.749   
0.0025    0.600    0.398    0.360    0.281    0.398    0.718   
0.0025    0.600    0.398    0.370    0.281    0.398    0.657   
0.0025    0.600    0.398    0.380    0.281    0.398    0.525   
0.0025    0.600    0.398    0.390    0.281    0.398    0.113   
 
2)  Case 2:  3 . 0 = ρ ,  005 . 0 = α
 
and  　 6 . 0 = β   or  　 7 . 0 .  
 
   




Preference Parameters of Utility  Debt Parameters 
Upper Limit   










  1 d   1 d   Φ  
0.0050    0.700    0.295    0.230    0.212    0.295    0.131   
0.0050    0.700    0.295    0.240    0.212    0.295    0.313   
0.0050    0.700    0.295    0.250    0.212    0.295    0.364   
0.0050    0.700    0.295    0.260    0.212    0.295    0.343   
0.0050    0.700    0.295    0.270    0.212    0.295    0.245   
                           
0.0050    0.600    0.395    0.300    0.282    0.395    0.203   
0.0050    0.600    0.395    0.310    0.282    0.395    0.405   
0.0050    0.600    0.395    0.320    0.282    0.395    0.489   
0.0050    0.600    0.395    0.330    0.282    0.395    0.521   
0.0050    0.600    0.395    0.340    0.282    0.395    0.523   
0.0050    0.600    0.395    0.350    0.282    0.395    0.496   
0.0050    0.600    0.395    0.360    0.282    0.395    0.435   
0.0050    0.600    0.395    0.370    0.282    0.395    0.313   
0.0050    0.600    0.395    0.380    0.282    0.395    0.048   
  
 
   




Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2 
 
It is possible to show this using the same logic as that used by Michel and Wigniolle (2007). 
We follow their proof for the most part but change some points. In equilibrium, the  market 
adjusts only the capital level, and thus we do not need to consider a change of  δ . Hence, for a 
given sequence of 
∞
=0 } { t t δ ,  Γis represented in the following way: 
~ ~~
( , ) [ , '( )]( ) [ , '( )] z k n z fk k s z fk d δ δ δδ
− − −−
Γ− ≡ − + − − +. 
 
We show that  0 = Γ   has a unique solution. In order to show this, we check the property of 
Γ . First, we check the  monotonicity of this function. The  derivative of the first term 
~
( [ , '( )]( ))/ nz f k k k δδ
−−
∂− + ∂   is  positive,  since  ) ( ' k f R =   monotonically decreases  in  k   and 
() 0 Rn Rk
k Rn Rk k n
kn




≤ ⇔ <− ⇔ + + >





. The derivative of the second term 
k k f z s ∂ − ∂
−
/ )] ( ' , [
~
δ   is negative, since  0
~
≥ R s . Hence,  Γ  is increasing in  k . 
 
Next, we assume a certain level of child benefit  δ . At this time, when  k   approaches  0, it 
can be bounded in such a way that  1 < k ⇒ ) 1 ( ' ) ( ' f k f > . Then,  we obtain the following 
inequalities: 
)] 1 ( ' , [ )] ( ' , [
)] 1 ( ' , [ )] ( ' , [
~ ~
~ ~
f z s k f z s




− ≤ −  
and thus,  
 
   





( , ) [ , '(1)]( ) [ , '(1)] zk n zfk s zf d δ δ δδ Γ− ≤ − + − − +. 
Finally, we have 
~ ~ ~~
0 l i m (, ) [, ' ( 1 ) ][, ' ( 1 ) ] [, ' ( 1 ) ] 0
k
d
zk n zf s zf d s zf
WT
δ δδ δ δ
→ Γ − ≤ − − −+ = − −+ <
−
 
because  tt Sd >   must hold. 
When  k   approaches  +∞, we can prove the following using the contrary thought: 
1 > k ⇒ ) 1 ( ' ) ( ' f k f < . We then obtain the following inequality: 
~ ~~
( , ) [ , '(1)]( ) [ , '(1)] zk n zfk s zf d δ δ δδ Γ− ≥ − + − − +. 
Thus: 
+∞ = − Γ
∞ → ) , ( lim k z
k δ . 
Hence, for any given sequence 
∞
= ∀ 0 } { t t δ , a unique inter-temporal equilibrium 
∞
= + 0 1} { t t k   exists 
and the proposition has been proven. 
  
 
   




Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 3 
 
We use (25) in this proof. We first calculate the change in lifetime utility  t U δ   when the 
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This equation represents the effect of a change in child-rearing subsidies  } ) {( 0
∞
= ∆ t t δ   on the 
lifetime utility of generation  t , given a set of debt policies  } ) {( 0
∞
= t t d . If the sign of the big 
parentheses of the first term and the coefficient of the second term are both positive, it would be 
possible to offer welfare improvement to all generations by enlarging child benefit programs 
since the sign of  t U
~ is positive from homogeneity. Moreover, since  0 / 1 > ∂ ∂ − t t W δ   from equations 
(15) and (25), the latter is always true in the case that the coefficient sign of the first term is 
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This form (B-3) holds when: 
0
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where  
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  holds 
according to Assumption 2. Thus, Assumption 3-2 is the sufficient condition that the additional 
condition holds.  
 
   




Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 4 
 
We use (25') in this proof. We first calculate the change in lifetime utility  t U δ   when the 
amount of child benefit  t δ   is increased. Thus, we can use the result obtained in the previous 
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The first term is always positive in this case. We are interested in the sign of the second term. 
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Cancelling out the term  )
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  is 
the sufficient condition that the additional condition holds.   














































  is the sufficient condition that the 
additional condition holds.   
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Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 5 
 
This utility maximization problem is characterized as follows: 















     (D-1) 
[Utility function]  1 (, , ) t tt Un XY +     is homogeneous of degree one   (D-2) 


















   (D-3) 
[Assumption 2] 11 '( ) tt R fk ++ =      (D-4) 













      (D-5) 
[Constancy]  t d const =       (D-6) 
 













  and consumption vector be  123 1 (, ,) (, , ) t tt xxx nXY + =   ,  where  , zd 
are constants. Then, the maximization problem is written as follows: 
 
[Utility maximization]  123 max ( , , ) Uxx x   s.t.  11 22 33 1 px px px ++=    (D-7) 
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=    (D-10) 
[Time evolution]  1 1 33 () x k p z px d −+= −    (D-11) 
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.   (D-16) 
From (D-10) and (D-16), the following holds:  
 
   












.   (D-17) 
From (D-10) and the relationship between  1 t k + and t δ , the relationship between  3 p   and  1 p   is 
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The relationship between total differentiation and partial differentiation can also be expressed 
with (D-17’), (D-9), and (D-13): 
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( ) ( 1)
d px dx dk
kpz x
dp dp dp
−++ −= .   (D-22) 
According to (D-20) and (D-15’), the left-hand side is negative. However, according to (D-21), 
the right-hand side is non-negative. This is a contradiction.  
 
   




Appendix E: Calculation of Example 1 
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1 β α − − = + t t R Y  
Deriving the savings amount as: 
) )( 1 ( t t t T W s − − − = β α  
⇒   ). 1 ( ~ β α − − = t s  
Factor prices are: 
ρ ρ t t t k A W ) 1 ( − =  
.
1 − =
ρ ρ t t t k A R  
Obtaining the dynamics of  k : 






) ( 1 − − − =
−
+ + β α
δ
δ α  































= +   
 
   




          and  β α − − <1
~
t d                     (E-1) 

























t d k  





































































































































































































































































































































































⇔ 　　   
 
   




    



































































































































































By using  d Q
~












0 ) 1 (
1
) (
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) (
) ( ) 1 ( ~






















+ − − − ⇔










< − − +
−
− − − − +
−
⇔
































Q zQ Q z Q
z



























































Q − − − <
−
− − − ⇔ ) 1 (
/ 1
) 1 ( β α ρ
δ
α
β α 　　  
)
~
1 )( ) 1 )( 1 (
~
)( / 1 ( )
~
( d d z d − − − − − − − < − ⇔ β ρα β ρ δ α α 　　  








+ − − <
− − − − − −
−
− >
+ − − >









β ρα β ρ
α α
δ
































　　    
   
   (E-3) 












− − + − − <
− −
− < <
− − − + − −
−
−











− − − − − −
−
− <

































β ρα β ρ
α α
β α β ρ ρα
β
α


















   




Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 6 
 




1 θ δ δ t t t t d d T − − depends on the parameterθ . Hence, 
under the assumption that  δ and 
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θ θ      (F-1) 
To search for the optimal value  θ of (F-1), we analyze the sign of the function  θ ∂ ∂ / T   using 
the preferences and production technology of Example 1. 
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　 　                       (F-3) 
Because (F-2) does not depend on the parameter  θ   and 
*0 lim ( )
z δ δ
→−Ξ = −∞, the sign of (F-2) 
is determined by the sign of the following value on (F-3): 
1 ~
~ 1
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z d      (F-4) 
The sign of (F-4) is subject to the following rules: 
1)  When  ) 1 /( 1 *
~
ρ ρ β α − − − − ≡ > d d ,  ) ) , 0 [ ( 0 ) ( 　　 　 　 　　 z for ∈ ∀ < Ξ δ δ .   
2)  When 
~
* 1 / (1 ) dd αβρ ρ < ≡− − − − , there exists  * δ from (F-3), then 
) *) , 0 [ ( 0 ) ( 　　 　 　 　　 δ δ δ ∈ ∀ > Ξ for   or  ) ) *, ( ( 0 ) ( 　　 　 　 　　 z for δ δ δ ∈ ∀ < Ξ  
      where  * δ denotes as follows:  
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Therefore, from (F-2), (F-3), and the above rules, we can derive the following rules: 
1)  When  ) 1 /( 1 *
~




is optimal.   
2)  When  *
~
d d < ,  0 = θ   is optimal if  * 0 δ δ ≤ ≤ and  1 = θ   is optimal if  z < < δ δ* .   
 
    
 
   




Appendix G: Proof of Proposition 7 
 
Debt financing is optimal in the no child benefit condition if and only if  (0) 0 Ξ>   holds if 
we use (F-2). Thus, what we would like to show is 
* d ∃   s.t. 
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Thus, the following relationship holds. 
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We can check these lemmas. 















































   




[Proof of Lemma G-1] Obvious from  00 Rk nn ≤⇔ ≥    in Assumption 3-2 
[Proof of Lemma G-2]  ( )
( ) ( )
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.  In addition, 
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approaches  0 + ,  () ' ()
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−   decreases and approaches zero. 













  and 
lim '( ) 0
k fk
→∞ = , when k   approaches  ∞ ,  () ' ()
'( )
f k kf k
fk
−   increases and approaches positive 
infinity. 
 
From five lemmas, there exists 

















, the following lemma holds.   
[Lemma G-6] There exists 
* 0 k >   such that 
* (0) 0 kk Ξ >⇔>   holds. 
 
Last of all, we require the following lemma to hold.  
 
   





[Lemma G-7] Consider the following system. 






    with following restrictions. 





   and  '( ) R fk =  
Then, under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3-1 and the no child benefit condition (i.e.,  0 δ = ), there is a 
bijection between  k   and  d    and the bijective function is a strictly decreasing function. 
 
[Proof of Lemma G-7]  nk S d nk S d =−⇔ −= −    . From Assumption 3-1,  nk    is strictly 
increasing in  k   and  S    is weakly decreasing in  k . Thus,  nk S −     is strictly increasing in  k . 
Thus,  d    is strictly decreasing in  k .  nk S −     is a continuous function in  k . Thus,  nk S −   ’s 
range is connected. Taking the connected area as  d  ’s domain, there is a continuous decreasing 
bijective function between  k   and  d  . 
 
From Lemma G-6 and Lemma G-7, the following holds. 
 
There exists 
* 0 d >   such that 
* (0) 0 dd Ξ >⇔<    holds.  
 
   




Appendix H: Proof of Proposition 8 
 
We use (25) and (25') in this proof. We first calculate the change in  lifetime utility  t U δ  
when the amount of child benefit  t δ   is increased. Thus, we can use (31) with  1 = θ
 
and the 
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In this case, we are interested in the signs of all the terms of (H-2). In order to have the 



























































































































































































Cancelling out the term  )
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Case 2: if  0 ~ ≤ δ s   and  0 ~ > δ n  
 
In this case, the first term of (H-2) is always positive. We are interested only in the signs of 
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Appendix I: Proof of Example 2 
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By using (E-1) and (E-2): 
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